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Neuroaesthetics: A Coming of Age Story
Anjan Chatterjee
Abstract
■ Neuroaesthetics is gaining momentum. At this early junc-
ture, it is worth taking stock of where the field is and what lies
ahead. Here, I review writings that fall under the rubric of neuro-
aesthetics. These writings include discussions of the parallel or-
ganizational principles of the brain and the intent and practices of
artists, the description of informative anecdotes, and the emer-
gence of experimental neuroaesthetics. I then suggest a few areas
within neuroaesthetics thatmight be pursuedprofitably. Finally, I
raise some challenges for the field. These challenges are not
unique to neuroaesthetics. As neuroaesthetics comes of age, it
might take advantage of the lessons learned from more mature
domains of inquiry within cognitive neuroscience. ■
INTRODUCTION
What does neuroscience have to offer aesthetics? Neuro-
aesthetics, as a field, is gathering force (Skov & Vartanian,
2009). As it grows, the field faces the challenge of being
both true to its scientific roots and relevant to aesthetics.
The term aesthetics is used broadly to encompass the per-
ception, production, and response to art, as well as inter-
actions with objects and scenes that evoke an intense
feeling, often of pleasure. I focus on visual aesthetics,
although the principles also apply to music, dance, and lit-
erature. The term neuroaesthetics is also used broadly as a
domain that has something to do with properties of the
brain as it engages in aesthetics. I describe the kinds of
writings that fall under the rubric of neuroaesthetics and
examinewhat, inmy view, is needed for the field tomature
as a science, particularly as an experimental science. I then
point to some questions worth pursuing in the near future
and conclude with challenges for the field.
NEUROAESTHETIC WRITINGS
Parallelism
Writings on aesthetics by prominent neuroscientists high-
light parallels between properties of art and organizational
principles of the brain. Zeki (1999a, 1999b) should be
credited for introducing neuroaesthetics into scientific dis-
course. He exemplifies the parallelism approach and ar-
gues forcefully that no theory of aesthetics is complete
without an understanding of its neural underpinnings.
He suggested that the goals of the nervous system and
of artists are similar. Both are driven to understand essen-
tial visual attributes of the world. The nervous system de-
composes visual information into such attributes as color,
luminance, andmotion. Similarly, many artists, particularly
within the last century, isolate and enhance different visual
attributes. For example, Matisse emphasized color and
Calder emphasized motion. Zeki suggests that artists en-
deavor to uncover important distinctions in the visual
world and discover visual modules that are segregated
functionally and anatomically within the brain.
Parallelism claims point to the fact that artists are ex-
perts of visual representations and part of their magic lies
in their creative expression of this expertise. For example,
Cavanagh (2005) also shows that images in paintings often
violate the physics of shadows, reflections, colors, and con-
tours. Rather than follow physical properties of the world,
these painters reflect perceptual shortcuts used by our
minds. Artists, in experimenting with forms of depiction,
discovered what psychologists and neuroscientists are
now identifying as principles of perception. Livingstone
(2002) and Conway and Livingstone (2007) reveal how ar-
tists make use of complex interactions between different
components of vision in creating visual effects in their
paintings. Livingstone suggests that the shimmering qual-
ity of water or the sunʼs glow on the horizon seen in some
impressionist paintings (e.g., the sun and surrounding
clouds in Monetʼs “Impression Sunrise”) is produced by
isoluminant objects distinguishable only by color. This
strategy plays on the distinction between the dorsal (where)
and ventral (what) processing distinction (Ungerleider &
Mishkin, 1982). The dorsal stream is sensitive to differ-
ences in luminance, motion, and spatial location, whereas
the ventral stream is sensitive to simple form and color.
Isoluminant forms are processed by the ventral stream
but are not fixed with respect tomotion or spatial location,
as the dorsal stream does not process this information.
Thus, isoluminant forms are experienced as unstable or
shimmering. Conversely, because shape can be derived from
luminance differences, she argues that artists can use con-
trast to produce shapes, and leave color for expressive, rather
than descriptive, purposes. Livingstone highlights the wayUniversity of Pennsylvania
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that combinatorial properties of visual attributes contrib-
ute to our visual perception. Artists use these combina-
torial properties to produce specific aesthetic effects.
Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) proposed a set of
perceptual principles that might underlie aesthetic experi-
ences. They emphasize the “peak shift” phenomenon as of-
fering insight into the aesthetics of abstract art by relying on
Tinbergenʼs (1954) work on this phenomenon. Tinbergen
observed that sea gull chicks beg for food from their
mothers by pecking on a red spot near the tip of the
motherʼs beak. However, the chicks respond even more
vigorously to a disembodied long thin stick with three red
stripes near the end. Ramachandran and Hirstein propose
that neural structures that evolved to respond to specific vi-
sual stimuli respond more vigorously (a shift in their peak
response) to underlying primitives of that form even when
the viewer is not aware of the primitive. Their hypothesis
is that artists producing abstracts make explicit use of
these visual primitives in evoking aesthetic responses in
viewers.
The parallelism approach to neuroaesthetics recognizes
that the production and perception of art ought to con-
form to principles of neural organization. Properties of art-
works and strategies used by artists have parallels in how
the nervous system apprehends and organizes its visual
world. The question for brain–art parallelism is how to
translate this starting point into programmatic research
with experiments testing falsifiable hypotheses.
Informative Anecdotes
A good example of informative anecdotes is observations
of the effects of neurological disease on the production of
art (Zaidel, 2005). The effect of brain damage on the capa-
city to produce visual art stands in sharp contrast to its ef-
fects on many other human capacities. Diseases of the
brain can impair our ability to speak or comprehend lan-
guage, to coordinate movements, to recognize objects, to
apprehend emotions, and to make logical decisions.
Although diseases of the brain can certainly impair the abil-
ity to produce art, in some instances, paradoxically, the art
seems to improve. Elsewhere, I proposed that such para-
doxical improvements can be produced by a changing dis-
position to produce art, an enhanced visual vocabulary,
better descriptive accuracy, or enhanced expressivity
(Chatterjee, 2006, 2009). Here, I outline the changes in
disposition and enhanced expressivity produced by these
“experiments of nature.”
Acquired Disposition to Produce Art
Neurological disorders that produce obsessive–compulsive
traits can also dispose people to produce art. Such a change
in disposition to produce art is exemplified in a subset of
patients with fronto-temporal dementias (FTDs). FTDs
can cause profound changes in personality. People with
FTD can be disorganized, socially disinhibited, and have
problemswith their language, attention, and ability tomake
decisions. Despite these alterations in comportment and
cognition, Miller and Hou (2004) and Miller et al. (1998)
discovered that some people with FTD develop a propen-
sity to produce art. They note that the art tends to be rea-
listic rather than abstract or symbolic. The art is most often
visual and is highly detailed. The artists with FTD them-
selves are intensely preoccupied with their art, suggesting
that obsessive–compulsive traits acquired through their
disease contributes to this artistic proclivity.
Other cases of acquired obsessive–compulsive personal-
ity traits have resulted in remarkable artistic output. Sacks
(1995b) described FrancoMagnani, an Italian painter in San
Francisco. Magnani painted hundreds of realistic scenes of
Pontito, an Italian town where he grew up. After a febrile
illness, which was probably an encephalitis, he began to
paint obsessively. Pontito was the only subject of his art.
Sacks speculated that Magnani had partial complex seizures
and was, in part, demonstrating the obsessive personality
disorder sometimes associated with temporal lobe epi-
lepsy (Waxman & Geschwind, 1975). However, instead of
being hypergraphic verbally, as is more common among
such people, he was hypergraphic visually. In a similar vein,
Lythgoe, Polak, Kalmus, de Haan, and Khean Chong (2005)
reported the case of a builder with a subarachnoid hemor-
rhage, who became an obsessive artist after he recovered
from the initial injury. He began to draw hundreds of
sketches, mostly faces. He then moved to large-scale draw-
ings, sometimes covering entire room, and confined his art
to a few themes. The authors emphasize his perseverative
tendencies as critical to the emergence of his artistic skills.
We also reported obsessive painting practices in an ar-
tist with Parkinsonʼs disease following treatment with do-
pamine agonists (Chatterjee, Hamilton, & Amorapanth,
2006).
A subset of autistic children produces striking visual
images (Sacks, 1995a). The most detailed description of
such a case was Nadia, as reported by Selfe (1977). Despite
severe developmental abnormalities, Nadia had remark-
able drawing skills. By the age of 3 she was drawing life-like
horses. She drew intensively for a few moments at a time,
always copying images. She also focused on specific kinds
of images like horses, of which she drew hundreds of ex-
amples. Although Nadiaʼs abilities were striking, she is not
unique. Autistic children with striking drawing skills seem
to focus on specific subjects and draw them repeatedly.
These artists produce realistic images and tend to be
preoccupied by specific themes. Although the neural basis
for obsessive–compulsive disorders is not completely un-
derstood, it is associatedwith a dysfunction of orbito-frontal
and medial-temporal cortices and fronto-striatal circuits
(Kwon et al., 2003; Ursu, Stenger, Shear, Jones, & Carter,
2003; Saxena et al., 1999). Notably, in the cases described,
these regions could have been damaged and posterior
occipito-temporal cortices were presumably intact. The
preservation of posterior cortices ensures that the neural
substrates for recognizing and representing faces, places,
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and objects are preserved and are thus available to be the
subject of these artistsʼ obsessions.
Enhanced Expressivity
Among the most intriguing effects of brain damage on ar-
tists is the class of phenomena in which the resulting art is
surprisingly appealing. Right hemisphere damage can pro-
duce left spatial neglect in which patients are unaware
of the left side of space (Chatterjee, 2003). Artists with ne-
glect omit the left side of images that they draw or paint
(Blanke, Ortigue, & Landis, 2003; Cantagallo & Sala,
1998; Halligan & Marshall, 1997; Schnider, Regard, Benson,
& Landis, 1993; Marsh & Philwin, 1987; Jung, 1974). As they
recover from their neglect, their use of line may still be
impaired. Two examples show how changed spatial repre-
sentations can produce highly regarded art. Lovis Corinth,
an important German artist, suffered a right hemisphere
stroke in 1911. As he recovered, he resumed painting.
His self portraits and portraits of his wife showed clear
changes in style, with details on the left sometimes left
out and textures on the left blended with the background.
Alfred Kuhn characterized his later work as shifting him
into the circle of great artists (quoted in Gardner, 1975).
Heller (1994) reported the experience of Loring Hughes,
who after a right hemisphere stroke abandoned her pre-
morbid style of depictive accuracy. Instead, she turned
to her own imagination and emotions. The artistic commu-
nity responded well to her new images. The critic Eileen
Watkins described her work as now delivering “an emo-
tional wallop,” that was not present previously.
Changes produced by left hemisphere damage are ex-
emplified in the Bulgarian painter, Zlatio Boiyadjiev, and
the Californian artist, Katherine Sherwood. Boiyadjievʼs
premorbid artistic style was natural and pictorial and he
tended to use earth tones in his paintings. Following the
onset of his aphasia, Boiyadjievʼs paintings have been con-
sidered richer, more colorful, and containing more fluid
and energetic lines (Brown, 1977; Zaimov, Kitov, & Kolev,
1969). The imagery in his work became more inventive
and, at times, even bizarre and fantastical. Katherine
Sherwood suffered a left hemisphere hemorrhagic stroke,
which also left her with an aphasia and right-sided weak-
ness (Waldman, 2000). Premorbidly, her images were de-
scribed as “highly cerebral.” After her stroke, she felt that
she could not produce such images if shewanted. Her new
style has been described as “raw” and “intuitive,”with large
irregular circularmovements. She says her left hand enjoys
an ease and a grace with the brush that her right hand
never had, and describes it as “unburdened.”
These cases are but a few examples of the neuropsycho-
logical effects of art (for comprehensive reviews, see
Chatterjee, 2004b, 2009; Zaidel, 2005). The next step is
to test the inferences made from these anecdotal observa-
tions. Todo so,we recently developed a tool, theAssessment
of Art Attributes (AAA) (Chatterjee, Widick, Sternschein,
Smith, & Bromberger, 2010). The AAA can quantify
changes in specific attributes of the art of any person with
brain damage. Charting such changes systematically will al-
low us to identify the specificity of patterns of change that
happens to production of art following brain damage.
EXPERIMENTAL NEUROAESTHETICS
Frameworks
An experimental research program in visual neuro-
aesthetics rests on two principles (Chatterjee, 2002, 2004a).
First, visual aesthetics, like vision in general, has multiple
components. Second, aesthetic experiences emerge from
a combination of responses to these different compo-
nents. The process by which humans visually recognize
objects offers a framework from which to consider these
components. Investigations can be focused on these com-
ponents and on their properties in various combinations.
The nervous system processes visual information both
in hierarchical sequence and in parallel (Farah, 2000; Zeki,
1993; Van Essen, Feleman, DeYoe, Ollavaria, & Knierman,
1990). The sequential components of visual processing
can be classified as early, intermediate, and late vision
(Marr, 1982). Early vision extracts simple elements from
the visual environment, such as color, luminance, shape,
motion, and location (Livingstone & Hubel, 1987, 1988).
These simple elements are processed in different parts
of the brain. Intermediate vision segregates some elements
and groups others together to form coherent regions inwhat
would otherwise be a chaotic and overwhelming sensory
array (Ricci, Vaishnavi, & Chatterjee, 1999; Grossberg,
Mingolla,&Ros, 1997; Vecera&Behrmann, 1997; Biederman
& Cooper, 1991). Late vision selects which of these coherent
regions to scrutinize and evokesmemories fromwhich ob-
jects are recognized and meanings attached (Chatterjee,
2003; Farah, 2000).
The hierarchical sequence of visual processing must be
reflected in visual aesthetics (Chatterjee, 2004a; for related
models that also incorporate broader contextual and cul-
tural factors, see Jacobsen, 2006; Leder, Belke, Oeberst,
& Augustin, 2004)). Any work of art can be decomposed
into its early, intermediate, and late vision components.
Aesthetic perception can distinguish between form and
content (e.g., Woods, 1991; Russell & George, 1990), a dis-
tinction demonstrated experimentally (Ishai, Fairhall, &
Pepperell, 2007). Similarly, scientists observe that form is
processed by early and intermediate vision, whereas con-
tent is processed by later vision. Thus, the early vision fea-
tures of an art object might be its color and its spatial
location. These elements would be grouped together to
form larger units in intermediate vision. Grouping creates
“unity in diversity,” a central notion of compositional
balance.
Beyond perception, two other aspects of aesthetics
are important. The first is the emotional response to an
aesthetic image; the second is how aesthetic judgments
are made. The anterior medial temporal lobe, medial
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and orbito-frontal cortices, and subcortical structures
mediate emotions in general, and reward systems in par-
ticular (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; Breiter, Aharon,
Kahneman, Dale, & Shizgal, 2001; OʼDoherty, Kringelbach,
Rolls,Hornack,&Andrews, 2001; Delgado, Nystrom, Fissell,
Noll, & Fiez, 2000; Elliott, Friston, & Dolan, 2000; Schultz,
Dayans, & Montague, 1997). Aesthetic judgments about
stimuli, as measured by preference ratings, are likely to en-
gage widely distributed circuits, most importantly, dorso-
lateral frontal and medial frontal cortices. The general
point is that visual neuroaesthetics, likemost complex bio-
logical systems, is hierarchical and can be decomposed
into stable component subsystems (Simon, 1962). This
hierarchical organization is precisely what makes experi-
mental approaches to aesthetics possible.
I have emphasized a cognitive neuroscience framework
for experimental neuroaesthetics. Another overarching
framework to think about aesthetics comes from evolu-
tionary theorists. They make three kinds of arguments.
First, beauty serves as a proxy for health and vigor in mate
selection. Second, beautiful objects are those that are com-
plex and yet are processed efficiently. And third, art mak-
ing and appreciation serves an important ritualistic
function that enhances social cohesion. Space limitations
do not allow an adequate consideration of evolutionary
perspectives on beauty and art (see Brown &Dissanayake,
2009; Cela-Conde et al., 2009; Dissanayake, 2008; Zaidel,
2005; Grammer, Fink, Moller, & Thornhill, 2003; Penton-
Voak et al., 2001; Etcoff, 1999; Rentschler, Jüttner, Unzicker,
& Landis, 1999; Thornhill & Gangestad, 1999; Zahavi &
Zahavi, 1997; Symons, 1979 for relevant discussions). Ulti-
mately, evolutionary and cognitive neuroscience approaches
to aesthetics are likely to converge in informative ways.
Imaging Beauty
Beauty is central to most peopleʼs concept of aesthetics
( Jacobsen, Buchta, Kohler, & Schroger, 2004). Of course,
not all art is beautiful and artists do not always intend to
produce beautiful things. However, beauty remains a cen-
tral concept in discussions of aesthetic experiences. Un-
derstanding the neural basis of the perception of and
response to beauty might give us insight into the percep-
tion of and response to visual art. Facial beauty has re-
ceived most attention in cognitive neuroscience.
The response to facial beauty is likely to be deeply en-
coded in our biology. Cross-cultural judgments of facial
beauty are quite consistent (Etcoff, 1999; Perrett, May, &
Yoshikawa, 1994; Jones & Hill, 1993). Adults and children
within and across cultures agree in their judgments of fa-
cial attractiveness (Langlois et al., 2000), suggesting that
universal principles of facial beauty exist. Infants look longer
at attractive faces within a week of being born, and the ef-
fects of facial attractiveness on infantsʼ gaze generalize
across race, sex and age by 6 months (Slater et al., 1998;
Langlois, Ritter, Roggman, & Vaughn, 1991). Thus, the dis-
position to engage attractive faces is present in brains that
have not been modified greatly by experience. Some com-
ponents of beauty are undoubtedly shaped further by cul-
tural factors (Cunningham, Barbee, & Philhower, 2002),
but the universal components are likely to have distinct
neural underpinnings.
Several studies report that attractive faces activate neural
circuitry involved in reward systems, including orbito-
frontal cortex, the nucleus accumbens, the ventral stria-
tum (Ishai, 2007; Kranz & Ishai, 2006; OʼDoherty et al.,
2003; Aharon et al., 2001; Kampe, Frith, Dolan, & Frith,
2001), and the amygdala (Winston, OʼDoherty, Kilner,
Perrett, & Dolan, 2007). These regional activations are in-
terpreted as reflecting emotional valences attached to at-
tractive faces (Senior, 2003). The particular emotional
valences are those involved in the expectation of rewards
and the satisfaction of appetites. The idea that attractive
faces are rewarding stimuli, at least for men, is evident be-
haviorally. Heterosexual men discount higher future re-
wards for smaller immediate rewards with attractive
female faces (Wilson&Daly, 2004). Presumably, these pat-
terns of neural activation reflect ways in which attractive
faces influence mate selection (Ishai, 2007; Kranz & Ishai,
2006).
Perceptual features of faces, such as averageness, sym-
metry, the structure of cheekbones, the relative size of the
lower half of the face, and the width of the jaw, influence
peopleʼs judgments of facial beauty (Penton-Voak et al.,
2001; Enquist & Arak, 1994; Grammer & Thornhill, 1994).
Winston et al. (2007) found that left posterior occipito-
temporal activity was enhanced by facial attractiveness.
We conducted a study to examine the extent to which
facial attractiveness is apprehended automatically. Partici-
pants judged the attractiveness or matched the identity of
pairs of faces. Attractiveness judgments evoked neural ac-
tivity within a distributed network involving ventral visual
association cortices and parts of dorsal posterior parietal
and prefrontal cortices (Chatterjee, Thomas, Smith, &
Aguirre, 2009). We inferred that the parietal, medial, and
dorsolateral frontal activations represented neural corre-
lates of the attention and decision-making components
of this task. We also found positively correlated activity
within the insula and negatively correlated activations
within anterior and posterior cingulate cortex. We inferred
that these patterns represent the emotional responses to
attractiveness. Importantly, when subjects matched the
identity of faces, attractiveness continued to evoke neural
responses in ventral visual areas. This neural response was
of a strength that was indistinguishable from the response
when participants considered beauty explicitly. We in-
ferred that this ventral occipital region responds to beauty
automatically.
Facial attractiveness has pervasive social effects beyond
its specific role in mate selection (Palermo & Rhodes,
2007; Olson & Marshuetz, 2005). Attractive individuals
are considered intelligent, honest, pleasant, natural lead-
ers (Ritts, Patterson, & Tubbs, 1992; Lerner, Lerner, Hess,
& Schwab, 1991; Kenealy, Frude, & Shaw, 1988), and are
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viewed as having socially desirable traits, such as strength
and sensitivity (Dion, Berscheid, &Walster, 1972). The cas-
cade of neural events that bias social decisions is likely to
be triggered by an early perceptual response to attractive-
ness. We proposed that neural activity within ventral visual
cortices in automatic response to facial attractiveness
serves as the initial trigger for this cascade (Chatterjee
et al., 2009).
Imaging Art
A few studies have used art to examine the neural localiza-
tion of aesthetic processes. Although the goals in these stud-
ies are similar, their experimental approaches differ and
the results, at first glance, appear quite varied. Kawabata
and Zeki (2004) asked participants to rate abstract, still life,
landscape, or portrait paintings as beautiful, neutral, or
ugly. Not surprisingly, they found that the pattern of activ-
ity within ventral visual cortex varied depending on
whether subjects were looking at portraits, landscapes,
or still lifes. In orbito-frontal (BA 11) cortex, they found
greater activity for beautiful than for ugly or neutral stimuli.
In anterior cingulate (BA 32) and left parietal cortex
(BA39), they found greater activity for beautiful than for
neutral stimuli. Only activity within orbito-frontal cortex in-
creased with the beauty of all the painting types and the
authors interpreted this activity as representing the neural
underpinnings of the aesthetic emotional experience.
Vartanian and Goel (2004) used images of representa-
tional and abstract paintings in an fMRI study. They found
that activity within the occipital gyri bilaterally and the left
anterior cingulate increased with preference ratings. They
also found that activity within the right caudate decreased
as preference ratings decreased. Representational paint-
ings evoked more activity within the occipital poles, the
precuneus, and the posterior middle temporal gyrus than
did abstract paintings.
Cela-Conde et al. (2004) used magnetoencephalogra-
phy to record event potentials when participants viewed
images of artworks and photographs. Participants judged
whether or not the images were beautiful. Beautiful
images evoked greater neural activity than not beautiful
images over left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex with a la-
tency of 400–1000 msec. The authors infer that this region
is involved in making aesthetic judgments.
Jacobsen, Schubotz, Hofel, and von Cramon (2005)
used a different strategy to investigate the neural corre-
lates of beauty in an fMRI study. Rather than use actual art-
works as their stimuli, they used a set of geometric shapes
designed in the laboratory. Participants judged whether
the images were beautiful or whether the images were
symmetric. Participants found symmetric patterns more
beautiful than nonsymmetric ones. Aesthetic judgments,
more than symmetry judgments, activated medial frontal
cortex (BA 9/10), the precuneus, and ventral prefrontal
cortex (BA 44/47). The left intraparietal sulcus was con-
jointly active for symmetry and beauty judgments. Both
beauty and complexity of the images evoked activity within
orbito-frontal cortex. In a follow-up study using the same
stimuli (Hofel & Jacobsen, 2007), they found that beauty
generated a lateral positive evoked potential in a temporal
window between 360 and 1225 msec.
One might be disheartened that these studies inves-
tigating aesthetics, report inconsistent patterns of activa-
tion. Nadal, Munar, Capo, Rosselo, and Cela-Conde (2008)
propose that these seemingly varied results of these studies
are compatible with the general model (Chatterjee, 2004a),
linking aesthetics to the neuroscience of visual and affective
processing as well as reward systems and decision-making.
Engaging visual properties of paintings increases activ-
ity within ventral visual cortices (Vartanian & Goel, 2004).
Aesthetic judgments activate parts of dorsolateral prefrontal
and medial prefrontal cortices ( Jacobsen et al., 2005; Cela-
Conde et al., 2004). In addition, emotional responses to
these stimuli activate orbito-frontal ( Jacobsen et al., 2005;
Kawabata & Zeki, 2004) as well as anterior cingulate cortices
(de Tommaso, Sardaro, & Livrea, 2008; Kawabata & Zeki,
2004; Vartanian & Goel, 2004).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As neuroaesthetics moves forward, several domains could
be pursued profitably. Here, I suggest three: explorations
of the relationship of perception to aesthetic experiences,
the nature of aesthetic judgment, and characterizing the
aesthetic reward.
The Relationship of Perception to
Aesthetic Experiences
As described above, visual art can be decomposed into dis-
tinct attributes such as color, line, texture, and form. Prom-
ising questions for empirical research include a better
understanding of how these visual perceptual attributes
contribute to the aesthetic experience. Can we measure
the contributions of these attributes? Some properties of
visual displays can be described with exquisite mathe-
matical precision (Graham & Field, 2007; Redies, 2007).
These quantifiable parameters might also be used in neuro-
science experiments.
How much of the aesthetic experience resides in a per-
ceptual experience and how much resides in the emo-
tional response to artwork? Paintings of landscapes are
likely to activate the parahippocampus, still lifes lateral oc-
cipital cortex, and portraits the fusiform gyrus. Does
beauty modify these activations further? Perhaps these re-
sponses simply reflect category-specific activations evoked
by perception itself and the aesthetic work is done within
reward systems. However, many feel that we perceive
beautiful objects more vividly than nonbeautiful objects.
Some studies show neural responses to beauty within ven-
tral occipito-temporal cortex. Does ventral visual cortex
contain general “visual beauty detectors”? Because people
are inclined to look longer at beautiful things, are such
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ventral visual activations a consequence of attention or is
there an independent aesthetic factor that modulates
neural activity? The relationship of attention and aesthetic
perception remains to be sorted out.
Fairhall and Ishai (2008), Wiesmann and Ishai (2008),
and Yago and Ishai (2006) have used paintings as stimuli
to study object recognition and recall. In these studies, they
find activations in limbic and prefrontal regions, suggesting
that emotional and reward systems are activated automati-
cally even though participants are not making evaluations.
The apparent automaticity of our response to beauty or to
art is an area that invites further investigation.
One could also investigate the relationship of percep-
tion to aesthetics in brain-damaged people. Some people
with brain damage probably do not perceive art in the
same way that non-brain-damaged individuals do, and
their emotional responses to artwork may very well differ
from those of people without brain damage. Such neuro-
psychological investigations of aesthetic perception to date
are nonexistent.
The Nature of Aesthetic Judgment
Recent cognitive neuroscience methods probe individual
differences. As these methods continue to develop, they
could also be used to examine individual differences
in aesthetic sensitivities. Aesthetic sensitivity has been re-
ferred to as a “T-factor”, for taste (Eysenck & Hawker,
1994; Eysenck, 1941). People can also develop taste with
training. Behavioral studies show differences in the way
that art-experienced individuals and art-naïve individuals
engage with works of art (Locher, Stappers, & Overbeeke,
1999; Hekkert & VanWieringen, 1996). Understanding the
neural basis for taste and the ways aesthetic judgment
might bemodified with training would be of great interest.
The studies conducted thus far suggest that parts of
dorsolateral and medial prefrontal cortex are involved in
making aesthetic judgments. These studies do not sort out
whether these brain activations are specific to aesthetic
judgments or are part of neural systems that make judg-
ments regardless of the domain under consideration. We
do not know if aesthetic judgments engage neural circuits
that are not engaged in other judgments.
Another issue around aesthetic judgments is the institu-
tional context in which art is usually viewed. For example,
Leder et al. (2004) argued that the same object is ap-
prehended and evaluated differently when viewed “as art-
work.” Recently, Cupchik, Vartanian, Crawley, and Mikulis
(2009) showed differences in brain activations when par-
ticipants looked at art paintings in an “objective and
detached” manner than in a “subjective and engaged”
manner with an emphasis on experiencing the mood
evoked by the paintings. They found greater activity in left
lateral prefrontal cortex in the latter condition, which they
regard as aesthetic, thanwhen participants looked at paint-
ings in a detached manner. Although the cognitive mech-
anism underlying this difference in activation patterns is
not clear from the experiment, it demonstrates that the
same object, when viewed under different conditions,
can evoke different neural responses.
Characterizing the Aesthetic “Reward”
Beauty is a critically important aspect of how most peo-
ple think of aesthetics ( Jacobsen et al., 2004). However,
aesthetics is not confined to beauty. Some artwork is spe-
cifically designed to be provocative and disturbing. Ulti-
mately, a comprehensive program in neuroaesthetics
would incorporate motivations in the creation of and the
response to art that engage emotional systems beyond
pleasurable reward systems.
With respect to pleasure evoked by beauty or art, the
imaging studies reviewed here implicate orbito-frontal
cortex, the anterior and posterior cingulate, the ventral
striatum including the nucleus accumbens, the caudate,
and the amygdala as mediating the emotional response to
beauty or to artwork. Presumably, these structures differ in
their functions. We need a better sense of how the orches-
tration of activity within these structures contributes to an
overall emotional aesthetic (Biederman & Vessel, 2006).
Evolutionary arguments for the importance of beauty of-
ten emphasize its importance in mate selection. Mate se-
lection is a utilitarian goal and the argument is that the
features that signal a desirable mate are the features we re-
gard as beautiful. This utilitarian goal is at oddswith an idea
proposed in the 18th century (Kant, 1790/1987) that the
aesthetic attitude is one of “disinterested interest.”On this
view, aesthetic objects give pleasure without evoking addi-
tional desires. Stated differently, what distinguishes the
neural response to an aesthetic experience from other re-
warding experiences? Could neuroscience contribute to
an understanding of disinterested interest?
Berridge andKringelbach (2008) andWyvell and Berridge
(2000) draw a distinction between “liking” and “wanting”.
Liking seems to be mediated by the nucleus accumbens
shell and the ventral pallidum mediated by opioid and
GABAerigic neurotransmitter systems. By contrast, the
mesolimbic dopaminergic system, which includes the nu-
cleus accumbens core, might mediate wanting. Cortical
structures, such as the cingulate and orbito-frontal cortex,
may contribute further to conscious modulations of these
liking and wanting experiences. This liking/wanting dis-
tinction is made in a rodent model with experiments
using sweet and bitter tasting stimuli. Whether the liking/
wanting distinction generalizes to humans or to visual stim-
uli remains to be seen. However, one might test the hy-
pothesis that a self-contained reward system exists and
forms the basis for aesthetic disinterested interest.
CHALLENGES
These are early days in the neuroscience of visual aesthet-
ics. With a field so young, development in any direction
would be an advance. However, I suggest that practitioners
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of neuroaesthetics might keep the following challenges in
mind: risks of reduction, distinguishing investigations prob-
ing the brain from those probing aesthetics, and adding
value toour understandingof aesthetics usingneuroscience.
Risks of Reduction
Experimental neuroaesthetics needs to conform to the con-
straints of any experimental science. That is, experiments
need to be motivated by general frameworks and to test fal-
sifiable hypotheses. Such experimental work would analyze
specific components of the broader universe of
aesthetics to simplify the domain needs in a way that allows
experimental control. Cognitive neuroscience studies of lan-
guage, emotion, and decision-making aremodels of this ap-
proach. Further, although qualitative analyses can certainly
provide important empirical information, quantification
more easily provides ways to test hypotheses rigorously.
The risk of decomposition and quantification is that re-
duction attenuates the very thingwe aremost interested in
studying. Take the example of the aesthetic responses to
beauty. Experimental aesthetics often addresses this issue
by obtaining preference ratings from participants. One
might ask methodological questions about whether
forced-choice approaches or Likert-scale ratings are a
more stable measure of peopleʼs preferences. One might
ask whether judgments of interestingness are the same as
judgments of preference. Or one might explore the rela-
tionship of complexity to either preference or to interest.
These are legitimate and important questions to be pur-
sued. However, the pursuit of such questions might easily
obscure the basic question of how preference is related to
aesthetic experience. Is preference a diluted version of
the former? Or are deeply moving aesthetic experiences
qualitatively different than those assessed in the laboratory
with preference ratings? What do neuroscientists make of
notions such as “the sublime?” The sublime is an emo-
tional experience mentioned frequently in aesthetics
(Kant, 1790/1987), but one that has, so far, had little trac-
tion in affective neuroscience. Reducing components of
aesthetics to quantifiable measures risks inviting the pro-
verbial problem of looking for the dropped coin under the
lamp because that is where things are visible, even if the
coin was dropped elsewhere. This problem is true for ex-
perimental aesthetics in general, not just neuroaesthetics.
Distinguishing Investigations Probing the Brain
from Those Probing Aesthetics
Art can be used to probe properties of the brain. Because
brain systems devoted to aesthetics are complex and orga-
nized hierarchically, processing art potentially provides a
unique window into the interactions of various subsys-
tems. For example, abstract paintings can be used as a
probe to investigate how the brain deals with indetermi-
nate visual stimuli and tries to make sense of its visual
world (Fairhall & Ishai, 2008; Wiesmann & Ishai, 2008;
Yago & Ishai, 2006). This line of work can be distinguished
from those studies that use neuroscience to test hypoth-
eses about the nature of aesthetics.
Fechner (1860), a century and a half ago, made the dis-
tinction between an outer psychophysics and an inner
psychophysics. Outer psychophysics is the study of the re-
lationship between psychology and the physical proper-
ties of stimuli. This kind of study has been the thrust of
empirical aesthetics ever since. Inner psychophysics is
the study of the relationship between psychology and
the physical (or physiological) properties of the brain.
Fechner recognized that an inner psychophysics might
be possible eventually. Neuroscience technologies such
as fMRI, ERPs, and transcranial magnetic stimulation now
provide the means of pursuing an inner psychophysics.
The nature of the triangular relationships among psy-
chology, outer physics, and inner physics could be made
explicit. Conducting research that probes the relationship
between outer and inner physics without direct recourse
to psychology is possible. Here properties of objects, pos-
sibly aesthetic objects, would be/are used to probe the
properties of the brain. In such experiments, finely charac-
terized stimuli are related to the spatial and temporal re-
sponse properties of neurons. Thus, one might find that
the lateral occipital complex responds parametrically to
some physical properties of objects, important informa-
tion in its own right. The unanswered psychophysical
question would be, do lateral occipital complex neurons
simply serve a classification function, distinguishing be-
tween objects and other visual stimuli like faces and
places, or do they also serve an evaluative function, being
tuned to whether the configuration of objects are appeal-
ing as in the rich tradition of still life paintings? To answer
this question, researchers would use the brain to probe
the psychology of aesthetics rather than using aesthetic
objects to probe properties of the brain.
A danger in experiments designed to examine the rela-
tionship between inner and outer physics is that of making
inferences about the underlying psychology without ade-
quate investigation of the relevant behavior. This general
problem is recognized in cognitive neuroscience as the re-
verse inference problem (Poldrack, 2006), where one uses
the location of neural activation to infer the underlying psy-
chological process. Such an inference is valid as a conclu-
sion if this area is engaged in only one psychological
process. Unfortunately, such one-to-one correspondences
between neural activation and psychological process are
rare in the brain. Findings of localized activations to specific
stimuli more often generate hypotheses about the mental
processes involved, rather than confirm these hypotheses.
Adding Value to Our Understanding
of Aesthetics Using Neuroscience
This issue, in my view, is the most important challenge for
neuroaesthetics. If the goal is to understand aesthetics (as
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opposed to understanding the brain), what does neuro-
aesthetics offer? When does neuroscience provide deeper
descriptive texture to our knowledge of aesthetics and
when does it deliver added explanatory force? Knowing
that the pleasure of viewing a beautiful painting is corre-
latedwith activity within orbito-frontal cortex or the nucleus
accumbens adds biologic texture to our understanding of
the rewards of aesthetic experiences. However, it is not ob-
vious that it, by itself, advances our understanding of the
psychological nature of that reward.
For neuroscience to make important contributions to
aesthetics, the possibility of an inner psychophysics has
to be taken seriously. That is, how do the physiological
properties of the brain and the psychology of aesthetics
relate to each other? More specifically, when does neu-
roscience add something to the understanding of the psy-
chology of aesthetics that cannot be discovered by
behavioral studies alone?
These are early days in neuroaesthetics. The challenges
mentioned here should not be construed as causes for
pessimism. These challenges apply equally to the cognitive
neuroscience of any complex domain. However, as neu-
roaesthetics comes of age, the field can be guided by the
lessons learned from investigations in more mature do-
mains, such as the cognitive neuroscience of memory, lan-
guage, and emotions.
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